A direct secure communication using step-split Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair is presented. Alice will sends one qubit of the EPR pair to Bob first. Then Bob sends a receipt signal to Alice through public channel. Alice performs her encoding operations on the second qubit and sends the qubit to Bob. Bob performs a Bell type measurement to fraw Alice's information. If Eve want to eavesdrop Alice's information, she has to attack both qubits of the EPR pair, which results in that any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected. Because of the receipt signal, this protocol can be divided into every complete independent run, which shows the superiority of the quantum direct secure communication.
Introduction. Quantum cryptography (QC) or quantum key distribution (QKD) exploits the principles of quantum mechanics to enable secure distribution of private information. In a QKD protocol, if the sender (Alice) wishes to send message to receiver (Bob), Alice should first encode her message on the travel qubit(s) and Bob should perform a decoding measurement on the travel qubit(s) to gain Alice's message. To perfectly complete the QKD, a reliable public channel is needed. Since Bennett and Brassard proposed the first QKD protocol in 1984 [1] , a lot of theoretical QKD protocol have been advanced [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . The aim of these QKD protocols to establish a common random key between two parties. The security of the resulting key is guaranteed by the properties of quantum information, and thus is conditioned only on fundamental laws of physics being correct.
T he step − split protocol. Recently, Beige et al. proposed a quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) scheme [13] in which the message can be read only after a transmission of an additional classical information for each qubit. In Ref. [14] , Boström and Felbinger presented a 'ping-pong' protocol which allows the information to be transmitted in a direct way,i.e., which does not needs to establish a random key to encrypt messages. In this paper, we will introduce a QSDC scheme using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair that is provably secure. The information can be independently decoded during the transmission in this protocol. The basis idea is come from the Ref. [14] . But we use a step-split method to transmit the information instead of the 'ping-pong' method.
An ERP pair can be in one of the four Bell states,
Here |0 > and |1 > are the up and down eigenstate of the σ z . It is well known that such EPR pairs can be used to establish nonlocal correlations over a spacelike interval. But these correlations cannot be used for superluminal communication. Consider Alice has an EPR pair in the singlet state |ψ − >. She sends one qubit to Bob and keeps another. Assume both Alice and Bob perform measurement on their qubits in basis B z , B z = {|0 >, |1 >}. When Alice's measurement outcome is |0 >, then she immediately knows Bob's measurement outcome is |1 >. If Alice's measurement outcome is |1 >, then she knows Bob's measurement outcome is |0 >. But whether Alice's measurement outcome is |0 > or |1 > is completely random with a probability p = 0.5. As long as one of them performs a measurement, the state |ψ − > will instantaneously collapse to a product state |0 > A |1 > B or |1 > A |0 > B randomly. The correlations do not exist any longer. So Bob can not get any of Alice's message through these processes. In order to sends message from Alice to Bob, a reliable public channel is needed.
When two qubits (A and B) are in the maximally entangled states |ψ ± > and |υ ± >, each single qubit is in the completely mixed states, ρ
No one can distinguish these states by an experiment performed on only one qubit. In other words, one qubit can be encoded by a local operation but it has a nonlocal effect, e.g.,
where
Anyone who only access to one of the qubits can not decode it since he has no access to the other qubit. Suppose Alice has an EPR pair in the state |ψ − >. She sends one qubit (we call it 'the first qubit') to Bob and keeps another. When Bob receives the first qubit, he sends a signal to Alice through public channel (we call this as Bob's receipt). If Alice receives Bob's receipt, she then performs an encoding operation on her qubit and then sends this qubit (we call this qubit as 'the second qubit') to Bob. Bob performs a Bell type measurement on two qubit to decode Alice's information. Alice's encoding operation can be described by
The state |ψ − > are transformed into |ψ − >, |ψ + >, |φ − >, and |φ + >. These operations respectively correspond to 00, 01, 10, 11. Also, to prove the security of this protocol, a check mode is needed. When Alice receives Bob's receipt, instead of her encoding operation, she performs a measurement in the basis B z or B x randomly, where
Then she tells the measurement outcome to Bob. Bob also performs a measurement in the same basis as Alice used. If both outcome coincide, then they known that Eve is in line. This communication stops. Else, Alice prepares next EPR pair. This protocol an explicit described like an algorithm.
(0) Alice prepares an EPR pair in state |ψ − >. (5e) Alice performs an encoding operation. She sends the second qubit to Bob. Bob receives the second qubit. He performs a Bell type measurement on two qubits to decode Alice's information.
(6) When all of Alice's information is transmitted, this communication successfully terminated. Security proof . If Eve is in line, she has to attack both two qubits of the EPR pair. Clearly, Eve can get no information if she only attack the second qubit. We will first prove Eve can not get any of Alice's information if she only attack the first qubit, which is quite different to the 'ping-pong' protocol [14] . Eve can use all technique allowed by quantum laws. The most general attack Eve uses can be described by a completely positive map [15] , which can be realized by a unitary operation in a larger Hilbert space. Since the first qubit is completely mixed to Eve, it is indistinguishable to Eve. Then the state of the qubit can be replaced by a mixed state ρ B = 1 2 |0 >< 0| + 1 2 |1 >< 1|. Then Eve adds an ancilla E in the state |χ > and performs the unitary operation U on both systems BE, resulting in
where |χ 00 >, |χ 01 >, |χ 10 >, and |χ 11 > are pure states uniquely determined by U , and |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1, |a| 2 + |b| 2 = 1. After Eve's attack, the state of the system composed of the two qubits and ancilla becomes
Then the states of the system composed of the first qubit B and the ancilla E becomes
Then Alice performs an encoding operation. With the probabilities p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , she performs the encoding operation U 0 , U 1 , U 2 , and U 3 ,
where p 0 + p 1 + p 2 + p 3 = 1. After Alice's encoding operation, it has
The states of system BE do not change under Alice's encoding operation, which implies that Eve can not gain any of Alice's information if she only attack the first qubit. To gain Alice's encoding information, Eve has to attack both of the qubits. She must attack the first qubit in the first step. After Alice's encoding operation, she has two attack the second qubit in the second step. Because Alice and Bob decide to perform check measurement only after Bob received the first qubit, the security proof has to assure Eve's any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected. If both Alice and Bob use the same basis in their check mode, their will not coincide if and only if their state is |ψ − >. If their state is |φ ± >, their measurement outcome will coincide when they use the basis B z . If their state is |ψ + >, their measurement outcome will coincide when they use the basis B x . Since they use the measurement basis randomly, then they at least have a detection probability p = 0.5 to find out Eve in line when their state is not |ψ − >. Suppose after Eve's first attack, Alice and Bob's state becomes ρ. The fidelity [16] of state |ψ − > and ρ is
Let us assume that
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Then the detection probability is d ≥ γ 2 . The upper bound on the mutual information Eve has with the state is the von Neumann entropy [15] ,
If λ i is the eigenvalues of ρ then the von Neumann's definition can be re-expressed
If F (|ψ − >, ρ) 2 = 1 − γ,then the eigenvalue of ρ is 1 − γ. The entropy of ρ is bounded by the entropy of a diagonal density matrix ρ max with diagonal entries 1 − γ,
If γ = 0, i,e, Eve has no mutual information with ρ, i.e., S(ρ max ) = 0, the detection probability is d = 0 on this condition. If Eve want to has the maximal mutual information with ρ, she has to let γ = 3 4 , i.e., S(ρ max ) = 2. The detection probability is d ≥ 3 8 on this occasion. We have shown that Eve can not gain any of Alice's information if she only attack the second qubit. So the mutual information Eve has with ρ determines how much information Eve can gain from Alice's encoding operations. If Eve has no mutual information with ρ, i.e., she does not attack the first qubit, then she can not gain any of Alice's information. When Eve wants to gain any of Alice's information, she has to let S(ρ) > 0, which makes Eve face a nonzero risk to be detected. If Eve wants to gain full of Alice's information, she has to gain full of the information of ρ, which let her face the risk to be detected with a probability d ≥ . Then Eve gain the second qubit in the second step. She performs a Bell type measurement on these two qubits to confirm which operation Alice performed. On this occasion, Eve can gain full of Alice's information with a detection probability d ≥ 3 8 . Suppose Alice chooses to the check mode with a probability c every protocol run. The effective transmission rate reads r = 1 − c, which is the probability for a message transfer. The probability that Eve want to eavesdrop one message transfer without being detected is [14] 
where d is the detection probability corresponding to the successfully eavesdropping the information I 0 (d). After n successfully attack, Eve gain nI 0 (d) bits of information, thus the successfully eavesdrop I = nI 0 (d) becomes
For c > 0, d > 0, this value decreases exponentially. When I → ∞, we have s → 0. So the protocol is asymptotically secure. If Eve only attack the second qubit, she can get no information of Alice's operation. All Eve's operations will become a denial-of-service (DoS) attack [17] . After Alice's encoding operation, Eve captures the second qubit and performs a measurement in the basis B x or B z which makes the state EPR pair collapse to a product state. Eve forwards the second qubit to Bob. Then Bob's measurement outcome is randomly in one of the Bell states. When the communication is terminated, Bob has learned nothing but a sequence of nonsense random bits. To attack this communication, Eve also can performs a unitary operation on the second qubit. She can performs the operation U 1 , U 2 , or U 3 on every second qubit, which leads Bob to wrongly decode Alice's information. Fortunately, with a reliable public, Alice and Bob can use a message authentification method to protect the protocol against man-in-the-middle attacks [18] .
In this protocol, Bob should sends a receipt every run. Without this signal, quantum channel losses may be used by Eve to eavesdrop Alice's information [19] . Eve can keeps the first qubit for a time. If Alice publish her measurement out, Eve then forwards the first qubit to Bob. Else, Eve receives the second qubit and performs a Bell type measurement to draw Alice's information. This eavesdropping can be hidden in the quantum channel losses, which can not be detected. In this protocol, Alice prepares next EPR pair only and if only one run terminated. This protocol can be divided into every completely independent run. This is a variant of Ekert91 [2] QKD protocol and the 'ping-pong' protocol [14] , whose object is to establish a common random key to encrypt message.
Experimental f easibility. In principle, any two-level quantum system could be used to implement quantum cryptography. In practice, all implementations have relied on photons because their decoherence can be controlled and moderated [20] . The Bell state of an EPR photons can be created by parametric down − conversion. It has been demonstrated experimentally that light can be stored together with their quantum states [21] . And the complete Bell type measurement is also been demonstrated [22] . The values of σ x , σ y , and σ z of a qubit of an single photon can be ascertained [23] . Altogether, the experimental realization of this protocol should be feasible with today's technology. This work is funded by National Nature Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 10274094).
